Query responses from the Central Election Commission (CEC) candidate asset declaration website included non-public National ID numbers of candidates that could be retrieved via browser developer tools; after a civic developer discovered and reported the issue on October 27, the CEC suspended the service that same day to fix the bug and stated on October 28 that preliminary findings pointed to an outsourced vendor error [1][2]. The Administration for Cyber Security (ACS), MODA received the report on October 27, dispatched personnel on October 28 to assist with security testing, and noted that the exposure stemmed from improper field filtering during program processing and data transmission [2].
Central Election Commission Candidate Asset Declaration Website Returns National ID Numbers of 1,573 Candidates; ACS Assists with Security Testing
2 min read
- Disclosed
- Oct 27, 2026
- Published
- Nov 7, 2026
- Last updated
- Nov 6, 2026
- CVSS basis
- Our assessment
- Technology
- Attack vector
- Impact
- Data type
On this page
30-second summary
What happened
Who is affected
Industries mainly affected: Government
What to do nowOur advice
- Agencies publishing public documents must verify PII redaction prior to release and purge unredacted files from CDN and search caches [1].
- Affected individuals should monitor for unauthorized use of exposed national ID numbers .
Timeline
Technical details
What Happened
According to iThome, developers building a civic election bulletin discovered on October 27 that although the website's search interface only displayed candidate names and constituencies, the backend JSON response returned the National ID numbers of 1,573 candidates without requiring any login credentials [1]. ACS explained that the issue occurred because "program processing and data transmission workflows failed to properly filter data fields, causing National ID numbers not intended for public query to be loaded into the relevant query files" [2].
Response
The CEC suspended the website on October 27, reopened it that evening after completing code fixes, and reported the incident to the competent authority; ACS dispatched personnel on October 28 to assist with security testing, the CEC altered its data transmission paths, and the root cause and scope of impact remain under investigation [1][2].
Our analysis
The following is our opinion, not a sourced statement.
This is a classic case of API over-fetching: just because the frontend hides a field does not mean the backend did not transmit it. Acceptance testing for outsourced websites should always include inspecting raw JSON responses rather than only checking the visual UI.
Remediation
Our addition
- 1Inspect actual fields returned by website APIs verify[1]
Use browser developer tools or API testing utilities to inspect the JSON payload of each endpoint for sensitive fields not displayed in the UI.
References
Official / primary1
- [2]
“因程式處理及資料傳輸流程未妥善過濾資料欄位,致原非供公開查詢的身分證字號被載入相關查詢檔案”
Media1
- [1]
This site aggregates public information and is not security consulting advice. Test remediation steps before applying.